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Siting Trailers in Post-Katrina New Orleans
Daniel P. Aldrich
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana and Tokyo University, Japan

Kevin Crook
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
To meet the dire need for housing following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans and Federal Emergency Management
Agency officials created lists of potential sites for trailer parks. We analyze approved sites to track which factors were
linked with larger (or smaller) numbers of trailers and trailer sites per zip code block. Areas which displayed greater
levels of social capital, as evidenced by voluntaristic activities such as voting, were slated for fewer trailers, controlling for race, income, education, flood damage, and other relevant factors. Civil society worked simultaneously to
bring citizens together while mobilizing them against the threat of trailer parks in their backyards.
Keywords: New Orleans; Hurricane Katrina; civil society; temporary trailers; facility siting

N

ew Orleans politicians, city officials, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
repeatedly stressed housing as their number one priority following Hurricane Katrina, which by some estimates damaged 434,000 homes in the New Orleans
area and destroyed nearly 140,000 of them. While
everyone in New Orleans publicly agreed that housing
remained the most critical obstacle to rapid recovery
after Hurricane Katrina, local controversy stalled the
siting of temporary housing after the storm. Most citizens recognized the need for facilities like trailer parks
and modular homes, but many sought that these facilities be placed elsewhere. Which communities would
be selected to host these trailers and their occupants
was a critical but unanswered question.
This article, set against a backdrop of local opposition, investigates which communities and areas in and
around New Orleans were selected as hosts for FEMA
travel trailers and mobile homes. We find that, controlling for a large number of factors, the strength of locallevel civil society best predicts which zip codes will be
chosen as hosts for more trailers and trailer parks.
Those localities with more politically active and
involved citizens who voted in past elections—a proxy
we interpret as defining an area with stronger ties and
a more vibrant civil society—were the ones which

received the fewest trailers. Conversely, authorities
selected those zip codes which demonstrated weaker
political activism for larger numbers of trailers.
This is an important finding because it calls into
question nascent literature which uncritically links
stronger civil society with more rapid recovery from
disaster. While initial research on postdisaster
rebuilding focused on the physical amount of damage
or aid received by an area (Dacy and Kunreuther
1969), or whether the area had learned to upgrade
mitigation systems from previous disaster experiences
(Eoh 2005), newer research seeks to link levels of
social capital to the pace of rebuilding. An enormous
canon of literature in sociology and political science
connects higher levels of civil society, defined as
networks of trust and reciprocity among citizens, to
better economic and government performance, at
local (Coffe and Geys 2005), regional (Knack 2002),
and national (Putnam 1993) levels. It is a logical
extension to test to see if stronger ties among citizens
Authors’ Note: We want to acknowledge the assistance of Scott
Croft and his colleagues at C&C Technologies, the Center for
Geographic Analysis at Harvard University, Adam Glynn, the
Housing Office of the City of New Orleans, Robert Paarlberg, the
Program on U.S.–Japan Relations for research funding, and Ezra
Zuckerman.
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create an environment where rebuilding takes place
rapidly and efficiently.
Research on postdisaster situations has demonstrated that in the aftermath of crisis situations, individuals embedded in stronger networks have more
resources, both emotional and material, with which to
rebuild their lives (Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs 2000).
Scholars have also illuminated the critical role played
by active social capital in recovery following Turkish,
Indian, and Japanese earthquakes (Özerdem and
Jacoby 2006). Others sought to connect state responses
to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami to vibrant civil
societies at the local level (Tata Institute of Social
Sciences 2005). Shaw and Goda (2004) showed how
the 1995 Kobe earthquake enhanced Japanese civil
society and allowed nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) to play a more prominent role alongside the
government in the rebuilding process. In a comparative
study of India and Kobe, researchers argued that areas
which displayed greater levels of trust and stronger
networks were better able to recover after the Indian
Ocean tsunami and the Kobe earthquake, although evidence was primarily impressionistic as opposed to
quantitative (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004).
Building on Foley and Edwards (1996), we see in
post-Katrina New Orleans a situation underlining the
so-called “paradox of civil society.” In their article,
Foley and Edwards underscored that scholars often
envision civil society in contradictory forms. One
vision of civil society emphasizes the (often positive)
impact of associational life on civility and governance while another common approach focuses on
the power of civil society as a counterweight to the
state (Hasegawa 2004). These two visions are logically and empirically at odds with each other. Here,
we argue that civil society plays a dual role in the
rebuilding process following disasters. It simultaneously strengthens the ability of local citizens to
engage in practices of “informal insurance” (De Alessi
1975) and overcome collective action problems
(Olson 1965), while orienting them to defend their
area against unwanted but perhaps necessary projects, such as trailer parks, which speed recovery.
Here, the “bonding” social capital which connects
neighbors to each other simultaneously prevent them
from “bridging” beyond their own area’s needs to
allow in trailers (Putnam 2000).
Our article demonstrates that stronger local civil
societies act as dual-edged swords during postdisaster
situations, helping draw back refugees to their communities and providing them with support but, at the same
time, not providing assistance to the citywide process

of rebuilding. Those areas where citizens have mobilized together also end up as zones where authorities
anticipate encountering the strongest levels of resistance to often controversial facilities such as trailer
parks. If city planners avoid siting in areas that they
judge stronger in social capital and search for alternate
locations for temporary trailers because of actual or
potential local resistance, those administrative, financial, and personnel resources cannot be spent on other
recovery activities. Hence, pockets and blocks of
stronger social capital may not necessarily result in an
overall quicker pace of rebuilding.

Trailers as “Public Bads”
Scholars and policy makers alike claim that temporary shelters, housing, and housing infrastructure are
among the critical needs after disasters (Anderson
and Woodrow 1998, 10; Richardson 2006). However,
in post-Katrina New Orleans, many local residents
viewed trailer parks as an additional blight, rather
than the solution to the housing problem. At
Lakewood Estates in the Algiers section of New
Orleans, local residents used human and vehicular
chains to block construction and surveying equipment brought by federal workers who intended to
begin siting a new temporary housing development.
The statement of one resident who told reporters
that, “I don’t want my neighborhood ruined because
theirs is [sic]” epitomized the problem facing decision makers seeking to site temporary housing after
the Hurricane Katrina. Councilwoman Cynthia
Hedge Morrell summed up the thinking of many
locals when she stated that, “You can’t rebuild a community if you are taking sacred parts of that community and destroying it” (quoted in Varney and Carr
2005). New Orleans Councilman Jay Batt put up
campaign posters with an image of a temporary
FEMA trailer crossed out by a red circle with a line
through it next to the heading, “He protected the
integrity of neighborhoods in district A by not allowing trailers to be placed in parks and playgrounds
where our children play” (Batt 2005).
Out of sixty-four parishes across the state of
Louisiana, half immediately banned new group trailer
sites after the storm. Scholars have estimated that
approximately one in four FEMA trailer parks initially proposed for previously undeveloped sites by
either FEMA or the city of New Orleans were
rejected by the potential host communities (Davis
and Bali 2006). Mayor Ray Nagin criticized the
influx of “not in my neighborhood thinking” and
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pleaded with residents to “come together as neighbors, as friends” (quoted in Nelson and Varney 2005).
Against this backdrop of NIMBY (Not In My Back
Yard)ism, Mayor Nagin and the Housing Department
within his administration worked with FEMA to create, revise, re-revise, and eventually release a list of
approved sites for temporary trailers and housing.
Trailer parks, often located on the “wrong side of
the tracks,” are heavily stigmatized (Takahashi 1998).
They are viewed as magnets for crime, loitering, drug
use, increased foot and vehicle traffic, and lower
property values (MacTavish 2006). Furthermore,
despite reassurances that temporary trailers are, in
fact, temporary, many communities, such as those in
Florida which hosted trailer parks after Hurricane
Andrew, continued to host trailer parks several years
after disasters (Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin
1997). Some critics interpreted local reactions to
trailer parks as evidence of the continuing racial and
class divisions which have plagued New Orleans for
decades (Nelson and Varney 2005).
We categorize temporary trailers and trailer parks
as other forms of “public bads” which impose
focused costs on local communities but provide diffuse benefits to cities and regions as a whole. The
term public bad is used to emphasize the focused
costs and diffused benefits which accompany such
projects and contrast them with public goods, such as
lighthouses and national defense, which provide diffused benefits and diffused costs (Aldrich 2005; Frey,
Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 1996, 1298 fn. 1;
cf. Reuter and Truman 2004). Trailers provide necessary housing for workers and families who will
improve the economic conditions of the city and
region, but focus potential externalities, whether
actual or expected, on local host communities. States
and developers around the world regularly struggle to
site controversial facilities, including nuclear power
plants, incinerators, and airports. Temporary housing
after a disaster seems to be no exception.

Explanations for Siting Decisions
Different observers see dissimilar landscapes
when envisioning how authorities decide where to
locate controversial facilities. Previous research has
sought to identify the factors which influence the
likelihood that local residents will end up with
unwanted projects in their vicinity. Some authors
have focused on technocratic criteria, such as the
space available in the target area and the density of
the local population. Others have underscored the

potential for environmental racism, where siting authorities deliberately site unwanted projects in the backyards
of ethnic and racial minorities. Socioeconomic conditions, such as poverty, unemployment, and house ownership may be linked to the potential for receiving such
projects. Following a super-catastrophe like Hurricane
Katrina, the amount of damage in an area may best predict siting outcomes. Finally, some scholars such as
Hamilton (1993), Clingermayer (1994), and Aldrich
(forthcoming) argue that authorities take into account
the potential for collective action in local communities. Areas with higher levels of social capital and
volunteerism are more likely to mobilize against controversial facilities and are less attractive to decision
makers as potential sites for public bads.
Table 1 below lays out five approaches along with
their key siting criteria: technocratic criteria, discrimination against minorities, socioeconomic, amount of
damage, and civil society.
Technocratic criteria, such as the amount of land in
an area or zip code block, or the density of population
nearby, may push developers to select or exclude
communities as hosts for trailer parks. Areas that
have little land or are densely populated, such as
urban, metropolitan areas may be worse candidate
sites than more rural, loosely populated ones. To test
this theory, we include measures of the area (in square
miles) of the zip code block along with measures of
population density (people per square mile).
Proponents of the environmental racism argument,
on the other hand, see controversial and unwanted
facilities like nuclear power plants and airports
located in clusters of ethnic, racial, and religious
minorities (Hurley 1995; Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp
2001). Such landscapes center on disadvantaged
groups who bear the brunt of public bads. In the
United States, for example, numerous waste repositories and incinerators are found in communities with
large populations of African Americans, Native
Americans, and Hispanics. A variety of community
advocacy groups have formed to combat what they
see as policies harmful to communities of people of
color. Critics of the post-Katrina rebuilding process
have argued that the locations of temporary trailers
reflect color lines within the city. We measure this
variable through the percentage of residents in the zip
code who are not white.
Another common explanation for the siting of
public bads focuses on the economic conditions in
local communities. House owners may be concerned
about loss of property values. Poorly educated, less
wealthy individuals may be more comfortable with
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Table 1
Potential Explanations for Siting Trailer parks
Explanation
Technocratic Criteria
Discrimination against Minorities
Socioeconomic
Amount of damage
Civil Society

Logic

Key Siting Criteria

Developers concerned solely with nonpolitical
characteristics in selecting host communities
Racial/ethnic majority punishes minority
Wealthy areas push away facilities; poorer ones
more comfortable with such projects
More damaged areas have a greater need
for trailers and will host more
Mobilization against facilities depends
on trust, networks, and social capital

the idea of living near a trailer park than wealthier,
better educated residents. For example, small towns in
rural North Carolina view prisons as public goods
because of the jobs and other economic benefits
(Hoyman 2001) despite fears of jail breaks, riots, and
other potential negative externalities. Others argue that
we are likely to find facilities like industrial waste
dumps and incinerators in communities with lower
levels of income (Mohai and Bryant 1992). However,
studies of waste facility siting in Canada dismissed
claims that siting was based on economic disadvantage
whether measured in terms of income or unemployment
(Castle and Munton 1996, 78). We measure socioeconomic conditions through income, unemployment, percentage of the population with income below the
poverty line, education level, and house prices.
An alternative theory might posit that the number
of trailers in an area is proportional to the amount of
damage that the area received from Hurricane
Katrina. A community with relatively little damage
because of flooding might have less demand, and perhaps less interest, in hosting refugees and trailers
from the storm, while an area which suffered devastation would allow or welcome trailer parks because
of the large number of local residents involved. We
tested three different measures for flood water depth
after Hurricane Katrina to model the amount of damage to each zip code block.
A final map of the siting landscape shows civil
society characteristics. This approach centers on the
relative strength of horizontal associations, the ties
between individuals, and the depth of shared norms
and behavioral expectations. Research on siting in
North America demonstrates that private developers
avoid areas with higher potential for mobilization
against their projects (Hamilton 1993). Authorities
recognize that tighter-knit, well-connected communities can better overcome collective action problems.

Area, population density
Percentage of residents who are nonwhite
Income, unemployment, percentage below
poverty line, education level, house prices
Depth of flood waters in the area
Percentage of eligible residents voting
in elections

Similarly, local areas with more homogeneous constituents, i.e. areas with stronger horizontal bonds
between citizens, are more likely than areas with
more heterogeneous constituencies to create zoning
policies which exclude unwanted group homes
(Clingermayer 1994). In communities with more
social capital and better linkages, antifacility groups
find it easier to mobilize and organize against
unwanted projects (Aldrich 2008).
A large body of research demonstrates that social networks are important resources for survivors of disasters.
A decisive factor in rebuilding is the support labeled as
“informal insurance” in which neighbors lend each other
money, tools, housing, and assistance (Beggs, Haines,
and Hurlbert 1996). Residents in areas with greater levels
of social trust and social capital share information about
bureaucratic procedures and upcoming application deadlines, work to monitor public areas to prevent dumping,
and share responsibility for deterring looting. Hence
research continues to stress the importance of local networks and social capital in rebuilding (Shaw and Goda
2004; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; Tata Institute of Social
Sciences 2005; Özerdem and Jacoby 2006).
While researchers and local community members
envision a strong local civil society as a resource for
survivors, states and developers may see it in other
terms. Research has shown that across nation states
and in a wide variety of project types, both state
authorities and private developers use pre-siting surveys to gauge the strength of local civil society. Areas
which demonstrate fragmented civil society, low
potential for mobilization, and weaker bonds are
envisioned by the state as better hosts for controversial facilities, as such areas will protest less rigorously than their stronger counterparts. In the North
American radioactive waste siting cases, for example,
researchers have uncovered how many companies
utilized a “windshield survey” conducted by driving
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through potential host communities and noting the
existence of signs of disconnectedness, low social
capital, and poverty.
In one notable case, court proceedings showed that
a surveyor had written “trailers everywhere” in his
description of a potential host of low-level radioactive waste, and then designated the site as “in” rather
than “out” (Sherman 2006). In Japan, governmental
officials surveyed the strength of local nongovernmental organizations in civil society, such as farmers’
and fishermen’s cooperatives, recognizing that the
strength of these groups strongly determined whether
or not proposed nuclear power plants would overcome local opposition (Aldrich forthcoming).
Nations such as the United Kingdom undertake similar investigations to estimate potential opposition
within civil society, sometimes through straightforward surveys of local communities (Rüdig 1994, 84).
French authorities may have selected several localities in Normandy for nuclear power plants based on
survey research which showed towns in that area
more favorable to siting than in other regions (data
reproduced in Hecht 1998, 248). Hence, in New
Orleans, stronger bonds at the local level may mean
that authorities sought to find more acquiescent host
communities for trailers elsewhere to avoid predicted
stalls and delay in the rebuilding process.
To test theories connecting the strength of civil
society at the local level with selection as a host for
trailer parks, we follow Hamilton (1993) and use
voter turnout in recent presidential elections as a
proxy for social capital and civic engagement.1
Research has long connected political participation
through activities like voting to broader engagement
in citizen networks and activism (Verba and Nie
1972). Individuals who make the effort to vote—a
costly activity—demonstrate a stronger orientation to
political and social issues and a willingness to volunteer their time than nonvoters. Walsh and Warland
(1983), for example, interviewed close to seven hundred “activists” (those participating in antinuclear
activities) and “free riders” (individuals expressing
antinuclear sentiment but not actively participating)
and found that activists were more likely to have
voted in both the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections. Following the lead of previous scholarship in
this area, we assume that this proxy of social capital
is constant over time. That is, areas which demonstrated strong voter turnout in past presidential elections are assumed to be as likely to do so in future
ones, and those areas remain bastions of stronger
civil society and interconnectedness.

We test the accuracy of these theories using data
on the siting decisions for thousands of temporary
trailers that the local and federal government hoped
to place in and around New Orleans following the
devastation of Hurricane Katrina.

Data and Method
Our universe of cases includes all of the potential
zip codes in and around New Orleans where both
FEMA and the city administration of New Orleans
could have placed temporary housing units following
Hurricane Katrina. We used the TAC-RC Master List,
dated June 29, 2006, provided by the Governor’s
Hurricane Housing Task Force and New Orleans
Housing Department to create a comprehensive list,
by zip code, of approved sites and trailers. With 114
zip codes in our data set, we need not use methods
such as endogenous, choice-based sampling or
weighting to make sure that our sample of cases
closely matches the actual population. Rather, this
data set captures all of the areas in and around New
Orleans where trailers could have been sited by city
and governmental authorities.2
We have measures of two different outcomes for
our dependent variable: the number of trailers in a zip
code, and the number of trailer parks. These are
highly correlated (measured at close to .8) but
nonetheless are both investigated in separate analyses
because of their importance; an area may have more
trailer parks but fewer overall trailers than comparable zip codes, and vice versa. Because our dependent
variables involve count data (the number of trailer
sites or trailers themselves per zip code block) and
are bounded at zero, typical ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression analyses would be inappropriate.
Additionally, zero-truncated Poisson models involve
assumptions about inaccurate nonzero counts within
the dependent variable which we do not believe are
relevant here. Instead, we use the negative binomial
model, which is a variant of the Poisson model but
overcomes the main problem with the Poisson model,
namely its assumption that the mean and variance are
the same. With the negative binomial, we allow for
mean-variance inequality. We used multiple imputation to fill in for missing values (a total of five data
points) across the data set.
Because our dataset investigates the number of
trailers and trailer parks per zip code, we must careful about making inferences at lower levels of analysis. We cannot speak directly about the case-by-case
decision-making heuristics employed by decision

384 Political Research Quarterly

makers, such as Mayor Nagin and the New Orleans
housing department. Our strongest claims can be
about the factors within zip code blocks which are
correlated with greater or less numbers of temporary
housing units. Mayor Nagin and his team of advisors
were the primary actors who selected the final trailer
park sites immediately following Hurricane Katrina.
We assume that decision makers’ impressions of local
level social, racial, technocratic, and civil society factors were based on available data which had been
recorded or intuited prior to the storm, and based at
broader spatial levels, such as the zip code block
level, as opposed to block-by-block or case-by-case.
One potential obstacle to zip-code based analysis
is the issue of spatial dependency; while there are
various technical fixes for issues of spatial dependency which can be found in the epidemiological literature, we assume that zip code blocks do not
interact with each other. Given the small size of trailers vis-à-vis the available areas in typical zip codes,
we have no empirical or theoretical reason to believe
that the number of trailers or trailer parks in one zip
code interacts with or influences the number of trailers in another, neighboring one.
We use the percentage of a zip code block’s votingage population that voted in the 2004 presidential
election as a proxy for the strength of local civil
society, following previous scholars who have tied
this measure into the potential for collective action
(Hamilton 1993). Furthermore, surveys of hundreds
of post-Katrina New Orleans residents indicate
strong correlations (chi-squared values of .001 using
cross-tabulation) between voting in presidential elections and participation in local civil society organizations (Student Hurricane Network 2007). This proxy
fits well with the indices of civil society created by
such experts as Robert Putnam, who includes voting
in national as well as local elections as a representative action of civic engagement (Putnam 2000). The
Louisiana Secretary of State website provided the
number of voters that turned out for the 2004 presidential election for each of the precincts. An archived
file, also provided by the Secretary of State, listed
registered voters updated on a weekly basis for each
of the past three years. We used a combined list of
active and inactive registered voters as of October 29,
2004, the most recent data before the presidential
election. Data on socioeconomic indicators came
from the 2000 U.S. national census, while information on water levels was taken from a number of
sources, including NOAA (National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration) lidar plots and local

observers’ estimations. Table 2 below provides descriptive statistics about our data set.
Note the enormous variation across our variables.
There were an average of five trailer sites, also known
as trailer parks, per zip code, with some areas receiving only a single site and others receiving as many as
seventy-three. Furthermore, while the average zip
code block was slated to receive more than 450 trailers, some had as few as three or as many as 3,800.
We use variation inflation factors (VIF) to test for
multicollinearity among our variables. Among the
full list of variables within the data set there is considerable correlation, especially among the voting
age population, income, and water-level variables.
Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt (2007, 69) report that “a
mean of the VIF factors considerably larger than one
suggests collinearity” and suggest a value under three
would be acceptable. Dropping factors with high
levels of multicollinearity, the mean VIF value in the
variables under study is under 2.45. We use skewness
tests to investigate the distribution of our dependent
variables (the number of trailer parks and the number
of trailers) and find that they are positively skewed
with kurtosis (thin tails in these measures). Given that
our count data displays a positive skew and thin tails,
it does not fit the normal distribution. To correct for
the heteroskedasticity of our dependent variable
(White 1980), we use robust standard errors.

Results
We used a negative binominal regression using robust
standard errors to analyze which factors influenced the
number of trailers or trailer site per zip code. Table 3
below reports the coefficients from this model.
A number of factors proved to be statistically significant at the .01 level, including if the zip code was
in New Orleans or outside it, population density, percent unemployed, and voter turnout. Of these variables, those with the largest effect (that is, with the
absolute largest estimated coefficients) on the
number of trailers per zip code are the New Orleans
dummy variable and the percentage of eligible voters
voting in past elections. It is important to note that we
cannot directly interpret these estimated coefficients as
we might with a typical OLS regression because of the
structural form of the binomial model. While some analysts have used incidence rate ratios (irrs) to better
understand the effects of negative binomial model coefficients, we instead provide simulations and confidence
intervals that produce more intuitive displays of the variables (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000, 341). Here,
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Full Data Set
Variable

Number of Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

114
114

5.640351
465.0439

10.49579
624.1753

1
3

73
3787

114
114

75.69211
1676.119

98.16411
2720.305

0.4
7.482612

445.7
12836.92

114

42.93246

26.18343

2.4

98.5

114

11.31754

2.92288

3.8

20.2

114

14.62544

9.652344

0

50.6

114

70.05789

9.778692

40.1

92.1

114
114
114

30544.71
79577.19
23.10614

8524.116
25839.15
10.36919

7448
42900
5.6

52375
184300
71.9

114

4.596491

1.906901

1

10.3

114

0.7273392

1.657396

0

8.5

114

0.7406798

1.658053

0

8.22

114

0.6015877

1.534462

0

8.117

114

0.6056942

0.064015

0.390533

0.7698048

114
114
114

0.1578947
17426.12
71.5421

0.366252
13516.77
6.457607

0
472
14.3

1
57638
86.8

Dependent Variables
Number of Trailer Sites
Number of Trailers
Technocratic Criteria
Area (square miles)
Population density
(people per square mile)
Discrimination against Minorities
Percentage of the population
which is not white
Socioeconomic Indicators
Percentage of the population
above sixty-five
Percentage of the population
which attended university
Percentage of the population
which attended high school
Income
House prices
Percentage of the population beneath
the poverty line
Percentage of the population
that is unemployed
Amount of Damage
Flood damage (calculated through raster
image estimation)
Flood damage (calculated through fewer
point estimates and maps)
Flood damage (calculated solely through
LIDAR estimation)
Strength of Civil Society
Voter turnout
General Variables
New Orleans (dummy variable)
Population
Number of individuals of voting age

Table 3
Negative Binominal Regression Model Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Number of
Trailer Units (negative binomial
model, robust standard errors)
New Orleans
(dummy variable)
Area
Population density
House prices
Percentage of the population
which attended
high school
Percentage of the
population which
is not white
Percentage of the
population that is
unemployed
Voter turnout
Flood damage
_cons
/lnalpha
alpha

Coefficient

Robust
Standard
Error

0.986198

0.412185

2.39

0.017

0.17833

1.794065

–0.001488
–0.000165
–8.72E-07
0.033492

0.001146
0.000044
5.47E-06
0.013797

–1.3
–3.74
–0.16
2.43

0.194
0.000
0.873
0.015

–0.00374
–0.00025
–1.2E-05
0.006451

0.000758
–7.8E-05
9.85E-06
0.060533

0.014204

0.005586

2.54

0.011

0.003255

0.025154

–0.211801

0.064027

–3.31

0.001

–0.33729

–0.08631

–5.26376
0.20741
7.249693
/lnalpha
alpha

1.495056
0.085361
1.08301
–0.127247
0.880516

–3.52
2.43
6.69
0.120351
0.105971

0.000
0.015
0.000
—
—

–8.19402
0.040106
5.127032
–0.36313
0.695496

–2.3335
0.374714
9.372355
0.108637
1.114757

z

P > |z|

Low 95%
Confidence
Interval

High 95%
Confidence
Interval
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4000
3000
2000
1000
0

Predicted Number of Trailers

5000

Figure 1
The Stronger the Mobilization Potential, the
Fewer Trailers per Zip Code

.2

Note: N = 114.

.4

.6

.8

Voter Turnout

our quantity of interest is the number of trailers per
zip code. The predicted number of trailers is displayed as a solid line, with dotted lines bounding it on
either side showing the 95 percent confidence intervals. For these simulations we set all independent
variables at their means except for the quantity of
interest (that is, voter turnout).
Figure 1 demonstrates that those locales with a
more politically active citizenry received far fewer
trailers than their less politically active counterparts.
Setting all other variables at their means (employment
levels, housing prices, education, population density,

percentage nonwhite, etc.), the model predicts that an
area where the vast majority (close to 80 percent) of the
population voted would be slated to receive fewer than
one hundred trailers. On the other hand, a less active zip
code area where only 30 percent of the eligible population showed up at election time would be chosen to
receive as many as 1,200 trailers. Also, our model predicts that a zip code outside New Orleans would receive
approximately 278 trailers (with a 95 percent confidence
interval of 214 to 342) while one within the New Orleans
city limits would receive closer to 1,029 (with a larger
confidence interval of 166 to 1,893). Hence, developers
were more likely concentrate trailers inside the limits of
New Orleans, perhaps with the intention of easing access
to grocery stores, medical services, and other needs.
To ensure that the results are not a function solely of
the number of trailers, we also tested to see if these factors influenced the number of trailer sites. The coefficients from these regressions are below in Table 4.
Note here again that a number of factors were statistically significant, including the New Orleans
dummy variable, high school education, and the voter
turnout. Those which were both significant at the .01
or smaller level and had a strong impact on the
dependent variable (that is, a large estimated coefficient) were few: the presence or absence of the zip
code within New Orleans itself, and voter turnout. As
before, we use simulation and confidence techniques
to demonstrate the effect of civil society on our quantity of interest, which in this case is the number of
trailer sites (as opposed to trailers themselves).

Table 4
Negative Binominal Regression Model Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Number
of Trailer Parks (negative binomial
model, robust standard errors)
New Orleans (dummy variable)
Area
Population density
House prices
Percentage of the population
which attended high school
Percentage of the population
which is not white
Percentage of the population
that is unemployed
Voter turnout
Flood damage
_cons
/lnalpha
alpha

Coefficient

Robust
Standard
Error

P > |z|

Low 95%
Confidence
Interval

High 95%
Confidence
Interval

z

1.182
–0.001
0.000
0.000
0.038

0.397
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.010

2.980
–1.210
–0.210
–0.940
3.670

0.003
0.224
0.835
0.347
0.000

0.405
–0.003
0.000
0.000
0.018

1.959
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.059

0.006

0.005

1.380

0.168

–0.003

0.016

–0.078

0.052

–1.490

0.135

–0.181

0.024

–5.278
0.186
2.115
–1.109
0.330

1.460
0.096
0.897
0.190
0.063

–3.610
1.920
2.360
—
—

0.000
0.054
0.018
–1.482
0.227

–8.140
–0.003
0.358
–0.736
0.479

–2.416
0.374
3.873
—
—
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Figure 2
The Stronger the Civil Society,
the Fewer Trailer Parks per Zip Code
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which indicated to site planners the degree of potential
resistance. Finally, Sherman (2006) revealed that siting
authorities seeking new locations for radioactive waste
took notice of social and demographic indicators which
tied into levels of social capital. In short, these results
are not the function of an emergency situation, but
rather reveal that even when not pressed for time,
authorities seek to place unwanted projects in backyards with less potential for controversy.
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Figure 2 displays more support for the argument
that areas with stronger networks of politically active
voters were not selected to host unwanted projects—
in this case, trailer parks. Our model predicts that an
area where 80 percent of the voters turnout in elections would receive only a single trailer park, in stark
contrast to an area where less than 40 percent did so,
which would receive fifteen or more.

Discussion
Some observers might imagine that these results,
which indicate that siting authorities took potential
resistance seriously when selecting sites for trailers,
were a function of the emergency conditions under
which FEMA and the city of New Orleans sought to
place temporary housing. After Hurricane Katrina,
with an extreme shortage of housing, these governmental organizations may have used impressions and
measurements to identify and avoid areas with high
levels of social capital to respond quickly to the enormity of the disaster.
Such thinking would overlook other studies which
have demonstrated even in nonemergency settings,
where siting procedures can take years, if not decades,
authorities take seriously the potential for resistance from
local communities. Aldrich (forthcoming) demonstrated
that with controversial facilities such as nuclear power
plants, dams, and airports, which can require up to three
decades to site, Japanese authorities placed projects with
an eye to the strength of local civil society organizations.
Hamilton (1993) illuminated that private organizations
seeking to expand existing controversial facilities
projects under normal decision-making conditions

This article has used the aggregate, zip code block
as its unit of analysis, but an alternative approach
would involve a multilevel, hierarchical model which
would use the smallest unit of analysis available, the
voting district, in conjunction with zip code level
characteristics. However, in doing so the researchers
would need to think carefully about the counterfactuals implicit in such a procedure: available lists of
trailer sites do not provide information on the areas
that were not initially selected into a pool of potential
sites for political, civil society, or other reasons. One
solution might be endogenous, choice-based sampling, with a matched site of observations using available technocratic criteria, but this would also involve
both strong assumptions (that the sampling technique
sufficiently captured alternative sites not publicly discussed by siting authorities) and would be resourceintense. Another approach would use probit or logit
with clustering around zip codes to investigate trailer
park siting in New Orleans (cf. Davis and Bali 2006).
Our results diverge to some degree from the conclusions of other scholars of trailer siting postKatrina, such as Davis and Bali (2006), who found
that a number of factors, including local politics,
sociodemographic characteristics, need, and site specific factors were at work in explaining the rejection
of individual sites. One explanation for the discrepancy between our findings might be that Davis and
Bali focused on greenfield development of individual
sites as opposed to aggregate numbers at the zip code
level which could either be greenfield sites or leased
into existing areas.

Conclusions
Our zip-code level data support arguments that
decision makers within New Orleans and FEMA took
seriously the threat from better organized and better
connected local areas when selecting sites for unwanted
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facilities. Edward Banfield and James Wilson (1963)
set off a strong debate with their argument that certain urban-based ethnic communities were “privateregarding,” that is, concerned for private, as opposed to
broader public gain, in contrast to “public-regarding”
worldviews which favored efficiency and good government. This article has gone beyond such binary categorizations to show that communities which are in fact
“public regarding” in terms of turning out to vote may,
deliberately or not, create outcomes which are “privateregarding” in terms of unwanted facilities. Our results
fit with those of others scholars who emphasize the
importance of civil society in siting divisive projects
(Hamilton 1993; Clingermayer 1994; Sherman 2006;
Aldrich forthcoming).
By avoiding potentially contentious areas, planners hope to speed up the process of recovery.
Councilwoman Jacquelyn Clarkson, whose district
includes Algiers and the French Quarter, spoke
openly about her quest to ensure that any trailers
placed in her district would be in locations that “don’t
intrude on our lifestyle.” Seeing resistance to trailers
as “common sense,” and not NIMBY politics,
Clarkson predicted early on that attempts to site trailers in the area of the Lakewood Country Club would
fail, as pressure from organized local residents would
ensure that the club “was coming off that damn list [of
potential sites].” Her comment that politicians and decision makers should “know our districts better,” (quoted
in Nelson and Varney 2005) fits well with the model predicted by our data. That is, savvy politicians—if not
always the FEMA and city bureaucrats selecting
locations for housing—should recognize the communities where stronger bonds between citizens bring
them into active participation in politics and siting
decisions and avoid those when selecting locations
for controversial projects.
Given that New Orleans and FEMA officials evidently sought to avoid delay and controversy by
selecting areas with less social capital for trailers,
how can we explain the loud disagreements and
protest over trailer sitings? We offer two explanations. First, planners themselves may make “forecast
errors” where they misjudge potential levels of local
resistance. In many past conflicts between citizens
and governments, officials underestimated the capability for local resistance (Apter and Sawa 1984).
Second, even if the individuals living nearby the
planned site do not participate in protest, extra-local
individuals, civil rights and environmental groups,
and other activists may often take up the issue to raise
its salience. Even the best-planned sites often end up
embroiled in well-publicized contestation.

While scholars may continue to envision higher
levels of social capital and civil society as inevitably
leading to more efficient outcomes and better governance, this study has given credence to the “counterweight” theories of civil society in which local citizens
join together to balance against state plans. Even after
a disaster, tighter and deeper local networks bring with
them a double-edged quality, assisting those nearby
but not necessarily those farther away.

Notes
1. Some observers might be concerned that local elections, such
as those for mayoral races, would better capture levels of social capital. We tested this theory using data from the most recent run-off
mayoral election in New Orleans on May 20, 2006, which incumbent Mayor Ray Nagin won. However, out of our 114 zip codes,
only seventeen had voting districts in New Orleans city itself, and
our attempts at integrating this small number of observations into
our large-scale quantitative analysis resulted in incredibly high
levels of multicollinearity along with far less analytic efficiency (as
we were forced to drop close to one hundred observations to match
the in-city blocks). Furthermore, turnout for the mayoral election
itself did not measurably affect the number of trailers per zip
code, while the percentage of voters from the zip code voting for
Mayor Nagin was only somewhat significant (p value of .014).
Furthermore, based on coefficient estimates of these seventeen data
points, zip codes which voted for Mayor Nagin were more likely to
be slated as hosts for trailer parks, an outcome which seems counterintuitive (as Nagin would not want to punish his supporters following a close election with a four-point spread). As a result of these
tests, we rely instead on presidential vote turnout.
2. The full data set is available in the Murray Research at Harvard
University for replication at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mra/
faces/study/StudyPage.jsp?studyId=565&tab=catalog.
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